docs(phase-2): complete phase execution
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NikitolProject
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.planning/phases/02-core-archiver/02-VERIFICATION.md
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.planning/phases/02-core-archiver/02-VERIFICATION.md
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---
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phase: 02-core-archiver
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verified: 2026-02-25T10:30:00Z
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status: passed
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score: 9/9 must-haves verified
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re_verification: false
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---
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# Phase 2: Core Archiver Verification Report
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**Phase Goal:** A working Rust CLI that takes input files and produces a valid encrypted archive
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**Verified:** 2026-02-25T10:30:00Z
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**Status:** passed
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**Re-verification:** No -- initial verification
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## Goal Achievement
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### Observable Truths
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Truths derived from Phase 2 Success Criteria (ROADMAP.md) and PLAN must_haves:
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| # | Truth | Status | Evidence |
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|---|-------|--------|----------|
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| 1 | Running `encrypted_archive pack file1.txt file2.apk -o archive.bin` produces a single binary file | VERIFIED | Functional test: packed 2 files into 373-byte archive. Output file created at specified path. |
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| 2 | The output file is not recognized by standard tools (custom magic bytes, no standard signatures) | VERIFIED | Magic bytes confirmed: `0x00 0xEA 0x72 0x63` at offset 0. `file` command not available but hex dump shows no standard signature. Leading `0x00` byte prevents MIME detection. No gzip/zip/tar signatures in output. |
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| 3 | Each file in the archive is independently compressed (gzip) and encrypted (AES-256-CBC) with a unique random IV | VERIFIED | Two copies of same file packed: IVs differ (`2a1d5ca5...` vs `2c8bc10a...`). `generate_iv()` uses CSPRNG via `rand::rng()`. Each file processed independently in pack() loop. |
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| 4 | HMAC-SHA256 is computed over IV+ciphertext for each file (encrypt-then-MAC) | VERIFIED | `compute_hmac()` calls `mac.update(iv)` then `mac.update(ciphertext)` -- exactly IV\|\|ciphertext. `verify_hmac()` uses constant-time `verify_slice()`. Tamper test: flipping one ciphertext byte triggers "HMAC verification failed", file skipped, non-zero exit. |
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| 5 | Running `encrypted_archive inspect archive.bin` shows file count, names, and sizes without decrypting content | VERIFIED | Functional test output shows: Archive name, Version, Flags, Files count, TOC offset/size, and per-file: name, original/compressed/encrypted sizes, offset, compression flag, IV, HMAC, SHA-256 -- all without decryption. |
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| 6 | cargo build compiles the project with zero errors | VERIFIED | Build succeeds with only 2 dead-code warnings for `entry_size` and `compute_toc_size` helper functions (acceptable, usable by future code). |
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| 7 | All binary format types (Header, TocEntry) match FORMAT.md byte-for-byte field definitions | VERIFIED | Manual review: write_header() writes 40 bytes in exact FORMAT.md Section 4 order. write_toc_entry() writes (101+N) bytes in exact Section 5 order. read_header() parses at correct offsets [0..4]=magic, [4]=version, [5]=flags, [6..8]=file_count LE, [8..12]=toc_offset LE, [12..16]=toc_size LE, [16..32]=toc_iv, [32..40]=reserved. All multi-byte fields use to_le_bytes()/from_le_bytes(). |
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| 8 | Round-trip fidelity: packed files are byte-identical after unpacking | VERIFIED | `diff` of text file and binary file both passed after pack-then-unpack cycle. SHA-256 verified during unpack. |
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| 9 | Already-compressed files (APK) are stored without gzip compression | VERIFIED | APK file packed with compression_flag=0, flags=0x00. `should_compress()` returns false for `.apk` extension. Inspect confirms `Compression: no` and `compressed_size == original_size`. |
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**Score:** 9/9 truths verified
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### Required Artifacts
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| Artifact | Expected | Status | Details |
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|----------|----------|--------|---------|
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| `Cargo.toml` | Project manifest with all dependencies | VERIFIED | Contains aes 0.8, cbc 0.1, hmac 0.12, sha2 0.10, flate2 1.1, clap 4.5 (derive), rand 0.9, anyhow 1.0. Edition 2021. |
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| `src/main.rs` | CLI entry point with clap dispatch | VERIFIED | 34 lines. Parses CLI with `Cli::parse()`, dispatches to `archive::pack/unpack/inspect`. All 6 modules declared. |
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| `src/cli.rs` | Clap derive structs for Pack/Unpack/Inspect | VERIFIED | Exports `Cli`, `Commands`. Pack has files (required), output, no_compress. Unpack has archive, output_dir (default "."). Inspect has archive. |
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| `src/key.rs` | Hardcoded 32-byte encryption key | VERIFIED | Exports `KEY: [u8; 32]` with non-trivial values. |
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| `src/format.rs` | Header and TocEntry structs with serialize/deserialize | VERIFIED | 212 lines. Exports Header, TocEntry, MAGIC, VERSION, HEADER_SIZE, write_header, write_toc_entry, read_header, read_toc_entry, read_toc, entry_size, compute_toc_size. |
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| `src/crypto.rs` | AES-256-CBC encrypt/decrypt, HMAC-SHA-256, SHA-256 | VERIFIED | 78 lines. Exports encrypt_data, decrypt_data, compute_hmac, verify_hmac, sha256_hash, generate_iv. Uses correct type aliases: `cbc::Encryptor<aes::Aes256>`, `cbc::Decryptor<aes::Aes256>`. |
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| `src/compression.rs` | Gzip compress/decompress and should_compress heuristic | VERIFIED | 51 lines. Exports compress, decompress, should_compress. Uses `GzBuilder::new().mtime(0)` for reproducibility. 18 known compressed extensions checked. |
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| `src/archive.rs` | pack(), unpack(), inspect() orchestration (min 150 lines) | VERIFIED | 328 lines (exceeds 150 minimum). Two-pass pack algorithm, HMAC-first unpack, metadata inspect. Directory traversal protection. |
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### Key Link Verification
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| From | To | Via | Status | Details |
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|------|----|-----|--------|---------|
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| `src/archive.rs` | `src/key.rs` | `use crate::key::KEY` | WIRED | Line 8: `use crate::key::KEY;` Used in pack (lines 72, 76) and unpack (lines 265, 272). |
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| `src/archive.rs` | `src/format.rs` | writes header and TOC entries | WIRED | `format::write_header` (L128), `format::write_toc_entry` (L144), `format::read_header` (L170, L236), `format::read_toc` (L173, L239). |
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| `src/archive.rs` | `src/crypto.rs` | encrypts/decrypts and computes/verifies HMAC | WIRED | `crypto::encrypt_data` (L72), `crypto::compute_hmac` (L76), `crypto::sha256_hash` (L54, L296), `crypto::verify_hmac` (L265), `crypto::decrypt_data` (L272), `crypto::generate_iv` (L69). |
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| `src/archive.rs` | `src/compression.rs` | compresses/decompresses based on should_compress | WIRED | `compression::should_compress` (L57), `compression::compress` (L59), `compression::decompress` (L283). |
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| `src/main.rs` | `src/archive.rs` | dispatches CLI commands | WIRED | `archive::pack` (L20), `archive::unpack` (L26), `archive::inspect` (L29). |
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| `src/main.rs` | `src/cli.rs` | clap parse and dispatch | WIRED | `Cli::parse()` (L12), match on `Commands` variants (L14-31). |
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| `src/format.rs` | `docs/FORMAT.md` | byte-for-byte field layout match | WIRED | Magic bytes `[0x00, 0xEA, 0x72, 0x63]` match. Header 40 bytes with identical field order. TocEntry (101+N) bytes with identical field order. All LE integers confirmed. |
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### Requirements Coverage
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| Requirement | Source Plan | Description | Status | Evidence |
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|-------------|-----------|-------------|--------|----------|
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| FMT-01 | 02-01 | Custom binary format with non-standard magic bytes | SATISFIED | Magic `0x00 0xEA 0x72 0x63` not recognized by standard tools. |
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| FMT-02 | 02-01 | Version field (1 byte) for forward compatibility | SATISFIED | Header version field at offset 0x04, validated during read. |
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| FMT-03 | 02-01 | File table with metadata: name, sizes, offset, IV, HMAC | SATISFIED | TocEntry has all fields: name, original_size, compressed_size, encrypted_size, data_offset, iv, hmac, sha256, compression_flag, padding_after. |
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| FMT-04 | 02-01 | Little-endian for all multi-byte fields | SATISFIED | All `to_le_bytes()`/`from_le_bytes()` usage confirmed in format.rs. No `to_be_bytes()` or `to_ne_bytes()` used. |
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| ENC-01 | 02-01 | AES-256-CBC encryption per file | SATISFIED | `cbc::Encryptor<aes::Aes256>` used. Each file encrypted independently with unique IV. |
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| ENC-02 | 02-01 | HMAC-SHA256 encrypt-then-MAC per file | SATISFIED | HMAC computed over IV\|\|ciphertext. Verified before decryption in unpack. |
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| ENC-03 | 02-01 | Random 16-byte IV per file, stored in cleartext | SATISFIED | `generate_iv()` produces 16 random bytes via CSPRNG. Stored in TocEntry.iv. |
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| ENC-04 | 02-01 | Hardcoded 32-byte key | SATISFIED | `key.rs` exports `KEY: [u8; 32]` constant. Used by both pack and unpack. |
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| ENC-05 | 02-01 | PKCS7 padding for AES-CBC | SATISFIED | `encrypt_padded_mut::<Pkcs7>` and `decrypt_padded_mut::<Pkcs7>` used. |
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| CMP-01 | 02-01 | Gzip compression per file before encryption | SATISFIED | `compression::compress()` uses `GzBuilder`/`GzEncoder`. Applied before encryption in pack pipeline. |
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| CMP-02 | 02-01 | Per-file compression flag, skip for already-compressed files | SATISFIED | `should_compress()` checks 18 extensions. compression_flag stored per TocEntry. APK test confirmed compression=no. |
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| INT-01 | 02-01 | SHA-256 checksum per file, verified after decompression | SATISFIED | `crypto::sha256_hash()` computed on original data. Verified in unpack after decompress (L296-304). |
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| CLI-01 | 02-01 | Rust CLI for creating archives | SATISFIED | `encrypted_archive` binary with clap-based CLI. Builds and runs on Linux. |
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| CLI-02 | 02-02 | Pack multiple files (text + APK) into one archive | SATISFIED | Functional test: packed text + binary into single archive. APK detection works. |
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| CLI-03 | 02-02 | Subcommands: pack, unpack, inspect | SATISFIED | All three subcommands implemented and wired. Functional tests pass for all three. |
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No orphaned requirements found -- all 15 requirement IDs from ROADMAP.md Phase 2 are covered by plans 02-01 and 02-02.
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### Anti-Patterns Found
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| File | Line | Pattern | Severity | Impact |
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|------|------|---------|----------|--------|
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| `src/format.rs` | 204, 209 | Dead code: `entry_size`, `compute_toc_size` unused | Info | Helper functions available for future use; generates compiler warnings but does not affect functionality. |
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No TODOs, FIXMEs, placeholders, stubs, or empty implementations found in any source file.
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### Human Verification Required
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### 1. File command / binwalk unrecognizability
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**Test:** Run `file archive.bin` and `binwalk archive.bin` on a system where these tools are installed.
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**Expected:** `file` should report "data" (unknown binary). `binwalk` should find no known signatures.
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**Why human:** Neither `file` nor `binwalk` is installed in the verification environment.
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### 2. Visual inspect output formatting
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**Test:** Run `encrypted_archive inspect archive.bin` on a real archive and review output formatting.
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**Expected:** Clean, readable tabular output with hex-encoded IVs/HMACs/SHA-256, correct alignment.
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**Why human:** Formatting quality is a subjective assessment.
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### 3. Large file behavior
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**Test:** Pack a file >10MB and verify round-trip.
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**Expected:** Pack and unpack succeed with identical output.
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**Why human:** Timeout constraints prevent running large file tests in verification.
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### Gaps Summary
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No gaps found. All 9 observable truths verified. All 8 artifacts exist, are substantive, and are correctly wired. All 7 key links verified as connected. All 15 requirements satisfied. No blocker or warning anti-patterns detected.
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The two dead-code warnings for `entry_size` and `compute_toc_size` are informational only -- these are utility functions that will likely be used in future phases (tests, other tooling).
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---
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_Verified: 2026-02-25T10:30:00Z_
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_Verifier: Claude (gsd-verifier)_
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